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This paper contributes to the study  
of a mostly neglected work of the 
fifteenth-century Italian literature: 
Sperone Speroni’s collection of short 
treatises (“trattatelli”) published in  
the fifth volume of his Opera in 1740. 
In particular, I focus on Della Pace  
(On Peace), probably a draft 
of a never-written longer treatise. 
I provide a transcription and English 
translation of the text as well as an 
analysis of its content and linguistic 
aspects. The focus of Speroni’s text 
is the discussion of the meaning 
of ‘concord’, which goes beyond 
the classical definition and brings 
to an unconventional analysis of 
also its opposite terms: discord and 
conflict. By reading Speroni’s writing, 
we discover his original thought 
nourished by Machiavelli’s and pre-
Socratic influences. This paper looks 
at Speroni not only as an author 
involved in literary debates, but also 
as a philosopher with an original 
perspective to be discovered.
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 That which scholars consider dis-
ruptive in the history of ideas depends 
not on only on the level of accessibil-
ity of primary sources but also on what 
we decide to draw our attention to. We 
naturally resist the idea that an author 
whom the scholarly tradition and text-
books have placed in a specific category 
could, in fact, surprise us with unex-
plored writing containing revolutionary 
ideas that shed new light on his cultural 
profile and context. This is, I believe, the 
case of Sperone Speroni (1500–1588) 
with his short piece Della pace, which is 
one of several unexplored texts written 
by the Renaissance author which is still 
under-investigated.
Speroni is usually considered a mem-
ber of the larger group of Aristotelian au-
thors operating in the sixteenth century 
Venetian area. He is mostly known for 
his contribution to the so-called ‘quarrel 
of language’ in which he argued for the 
use of the Italian vernacular as a lan-
guage that deserves to achieve the level 
of complexity of Latin and Greek, and 
which should  replace them in discuss-
ing and writing about high culture and 
sciences. Speroni argues for this in his 
Dialogo delle lingue and contributes to the 
development of the vernacular by writing 
all his work in Italian and requiring the 
use of the vernacular for the discussions 
within the ‘Accademia degli Infiammati’ 
in which he played a central role and 
which he also led as its princeps for sev-
eral months between 1541 and 1542. His 
interest and expertise in rhetoric as well 
as his practice of an exquisite eloquence 
plaid a central role in allowing him to 
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participate in the ‘Accademia delle Notti 
Vaticane’ in Rome between 1560 and 
1564, where he gave speeches under the 
name of Nestor, the Homerian character 
which represents excellence in oratory. 
Speroni is also mostly studied for his lit-
erary production of dialogues, collected 
and published for the first time in 1542, 
and for the theory of dialogue in his Ap-
ologia dei dialoghi written between 1574 
and 1575 to defend his dialogues before 
the Catholic Inquisition which consid-
ered some of them, especially the Dialogo 
della Discordia and Dialogo della Usura, 
a possible threat to Christian doctrine 
and public morality.1 This is, in short, 
Speroni’s cultural identity according to 
the scholarly tradition: an Aristotelian 
author who follows the sixteenth cen-
tury preference for the dialogical genre 
and fights the humanistic tradition to 
impose the vernacular as a means of 
cultural communication. Only in recent 
years have scholars reached a better un-
derstanding of some original aspects 
related to his rhetoric and philosophy 
which have encouraged the addressing 
of Speroni’s unexplored texts – in fact 
the majority of his literary production.2 
The more we explore, the more we dis-
cover that Speroni’s intellectual profile 
is much more complex than what the 
scholarly tradition had offered to us up 
until few years ago. He uses, for example, 
Platonic figures of speech to express his 
anti-Platonic positions and Aristotelian 
1 For a general presentation of the author 
and his work, see Pozzi 1996 and Piantoni 
2018.
2 The most recent studies are the mono-
graphs Katinis 2018 and Cotugno 2018.
ideas to go beyond Aristotle and even 
against him. He supports not only rhet-
oric but also the most extreme of the 
sophistic tradition against both the Pla-
tonic and Aristotelian condemnation of 
it, while his political theories seems to 
have much more place than we assumed 
in his literary production with a clear 
critical approach towards any idealistic 
approach to the subject.
This is an exciting moment in the 
investigation of the most original as-
pects of Speroni’s style and philosophy 
and in order to elaborate further in 
this direction I will provide a study of 
his Della pace as an attempt to measure 
Speroni’s originality using a political 
subject: the role and definition of con-
cord in the life of a republic. Against 
the humanist background and beyond 
the Aristotelian legacy and even Machi-
avelli’s influence, Speroni’s text reveals 
aspects that deserve specific attention 
and stand as a case study to cast a light to 
a hitherto unexplored part of the Italian 
Renaissance.
speronI’s Della pace as 
a “trattatello”
The Della pace belongs to the collection 
of so-called “trattatelli”, short treatises 
gathered in the fifth and last volume 
of the edition of Speroni’s  writings 
published in Venice in 1740 by Marco 
Forcellini and Natale Dalle Laste. 
The “trattatelli” are the part of Sper-
oni’s production which have received 
the least degree of attention by schol-
arship thus far, but which neverthe-
less contain surprising and innovative 
positions, for example a unique attack 
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against Socrates (Contra Socrate) and 
a surprising defense of the sophists (In 
difesa dei sofisti).3 These short writings 
were in all probability drafts for what 
maybe Speroni intended to develop as 
more extensive treatises, or speeches 
to be delivered, or letters, or even dia-
logues to add to his collection published 
in 1542. A deeper understanding of the 
genesis and their final destination in 
Speroni’s literary and intellectual tra-
jectory would need an exploration and 
philological study of the 17 volumes of 
Speroni’s manuscripts in the Biblioteca 
Capitolare of Padua, which goes beyond 
the purpose of this contribution.4
The transcription that I  offer in 
the Appendix is from the 1740 edition 
which is much more readable than Sper-
oni’s autograph in manuscript E.13/XI 
(287r-288v) kept in the Biblioteca Cap-
itolare of Padua, especially if one does 
not have access to a direct examination 
of the source. As a matter of fact, the 
library has been under restoration for 
a long time and it is currently not possi-
ble to consult its archive in person. Nev-
ertheless, the reproduction is enough 
to verify that there is no relevant differ-
ence between Speroni’s autograph and 
the 1740 edition, and it is also useful 
to reveal other aspects of the original. 
First of all, the title Della pace is writ-
ten in a different hand and pen on the 
upper left-hand corner of the first page, 
the same hand that wrote the index of 
contents at the beginning of volume XI 
3 See the textual Appendix in Katinis 2018, 
p. 149–160.
4 On Speroni’s  manuscripts, see Bellinati 
1989 and Grata 2013.
(IIIr-v) of Speroni’s manuscripts. The 
same hand wrote a note above the index 
stating that those contents are copied 
in the 1740 edition. Speroni did not, 
however, provide any title for his text 
and the structure and disposition of his 
sentences suggest that this was mostly 
a list of private notes. The sequence of the 
first four sentences follows, for example, 
a symmetric order in the manuscript and 
they are ordered as a list of sequential 
thoughts (“La pace è … / comunemente 
…/ la guerra e’ … / comunemente ….”). 
Even the collection title “trattatelli” 
is not in the manuscript but was instead 
provided by the editors of the 1740 edi-
tion (neither by Speroni nor by the later 
hand mentioned above). Although it is 
unclear how Speroni viewed this collec-
tion of short writings of his, it is worth 
noticing that for the text entitled (by 
someone else) Della pace the category 
“trattatello” fits quite well with what 
should have been the final result ac-
cording to an indication in the very text 
(p. 438) in which Speroni refers to his 
work (or to the final version that would 
have emerged) as “questo trattato”. I do 
not want to speculate about what the 
final version of this writing would have 
been, but I do have to admit that I regret 
that we do not have it. I believe that the 
implications and the further elaboration 
of what it is here in nuce would have been 
of the most interest for the history of 
Renaissance literature. This would in all 
probability also be true for several other 
“trattatelli” by Speroni which propose 
very original perspectives.
As a  draft of some possible nev-
er-completed final work, Speroni’s Della 
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pace presents some ambiguities in the 
writing and also in the logic of certain 
passages. These issues cannot be avoided 
but, nevertheless, the text appears to be 
quite clear in the points Speroni wants 
to make and allows for an outline of Spe- 
roni’s work.
a worK outlIne
Speroni begins his argumentation with 
certain clarifications: peace is com-
monly intended as a union, but not in 
the sense of unification in one substance 
of different things, but more in the sense 
of concord of different things. In par-
ticular, since this text focuses on the 
peace within a city, we deal with the 
concord of different citizens’ opinions 
and wills. The internal conflicts be-
tween contraries, such as reason and 
affection or desire, is a natural state of 
being both in the city as well as in each 
man, while concord, even the imper-
fect one, is difficult to achieve. Indeed, 
the author claims as a universal truth, 
a Weltanschauung sketched in a few lines 
that echoes Heraclitus’ idea of polemos as 
a universal law, that the entire world is 
ruled by conflict. According to Speroni, 
the world is made up of contraries, nev-
ertheless concord is an effort to be done 
for specific political benefit. Speroni 
also invites us to consider that discord 
is created by God to give life to the world 
through contraries (night and day, dif-
ferent seasons, etc). The world would not 
exist without conflict and discord. 
This reasoning echoes the self-de-
fense that the goddess Discord provides 
in Speroni’s  Dialogo della Discordia 
in which Discord presents herself as 
a universal law that rules the natural 
and human world, a necessary and ben-
eficial figure that is unjustly condemned 
by men and gods. This dialogue in Lu-
cian style might have been inspired by 
Desiderius Erasmus’ Praise of Folly, al-
though Speroni replaces Folly with a dif-
ferent character. Scholars have usually 
viewed the staging of Discord’s self-de-
fense before Jove as a paradoxical work 
and a rhetorical exercise that demon-
strates the power of eloquence against 
common sense. This paradoxical aspect 
of Discord’s defense is called into doubt, 
however, by the Della pace in which Sper-
oni clearly recognizes discord as created 
by God for the benefit of the world at all 
levels and argues for this directly, in-
volving no dialogical mask.5 The uncer-
tain date of composition of the Della pace 
does not allow for a determination of 
the chronological proximity to the Dia-
logo della Discordia but, regardless of the 
date of composition, the very presence 
of this “trattatello” in Speroni’s literary 
production demonstrates that discord 
was for Speroni not only a mythological 
figure for a paradoxical mise-en-scène but 
instead a main factor to take into con-
sideration when we talk about political 
life in a broader natural context.
In his Della pace, Speroni argues that 
if discord in nature exists for a good rea-
son, one can argue the same about the 
disagreement between men’s wills; in-
deed, this gives birth to the virtues. The 
political peace, in  contrast, stems from 
 
5 Katinis 2018, p. 92. On this dialogue, see 
also Fournel 1990, p. 191–195; Buranello 
1999; Katinis 2015.
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concord – and not from a true unification 
that is impossible to reach – of different 
wills, which allow for man’s happiness, 
but only the type of happiness envisaged 
by the philosopher that looks at the in-
terests of the public sphere, not by the 
Christian. The latter seeks out a perfect 
concord and true peace for each man, 
which is true well-being (“salute” from 
the Latin “salus” in the double sense of 
health and salvation) but impossible to 
achieve in the city and very difficult to 
reach for any individual. Speroni con-
siders the ideal men proposed by Chris-
tianity above human possibilities, while 
the Christian principle that calls for 
treating others as you would want them 
to treat you is against human nature. 
Each man, as any other animal, wants by 
nature to control others and use them to 
satisfy his own desires, while he avoids 
the opposite. Taking a distance from the 
humanist ideal of human dignity above 
instinctual nature (or at least the possi-
bility of that), Speroni does not perceive 
any difference between human behavior 
and any other animal that hunts and 
kills to survive, although men also need 
to build a republic to survive so that 
their instinct to subjugate each other 
has to also confront other needs. Given 
all this, true peace among men would 
only be possible in a Christian republic 
which is above the actual republics as an 
ideal Christian man is above men’s na-
ture. The actual republics do not strive 
therefore for true peace but only for the 
kind of concord that prevents any public 
harm. The purpose of Speroni’s writing 
is precisely to clarify the meaning of the 
only peace possible in nature, a peace 
that, far from being perfect harmony, 
aims at establishing a safe environment 
for the citizens. This is a fictional (“sim-
ulata”) and conventional peace which 
is not true friendship but only refrains 
from attacking each other.
It is worth noting that this disen-
chanted perspective does not spare bibli-
cal figures such as Job and the Apostles. 
Speroni wrote that the correct reading 
of the Sacred Texts to describe the for-
mer (“erat timens Deum”) as well as the 
words pronounced by the latter (“quid 
erit nobis?”) would demonstrate that 
even these high examples of sanctity 
demonstrate that our deeds always aim 
at obtaining a prize and avoiding a pun-
ishment. In other words, even the most 
religious men follow human nature that 
encourages them to act in their own 
interest which consists of avoiding de-
struction and prolonging life. 
As it is for true peace, true friend-
ship, harmony and virtue among men 
are also impossible to achieve. Indeed, 
towards the end of his writing, Speroni 
proposes several examples of earthly, 
i.e. imperfect, friendship (“mondana 
amicizia”) among relatively vicious men 
(“viziosi”, “non boni”), such as Theseus 
and Pirithous, Pylades and Orestes, 
and Patroclus and Achilles, to demon-
strate that this kind of friendship is the 
norm among men. In summary, Sper-
oni suggests being aware that when we 
talk about peace, friendship, concord, 
and similar concepts related to human 
nature and human communities, we 
should refer not to an ideal form but only 
to a version of them that is applicable in 
our imperfect earthly world.
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machIavellI and beyond
Speroni’s disenchanted representation 
of human nature and the limits of any 
idealistic republic is a clear statement 
of anti-Platonism and suggests that his 
thought is under the influence of Nic-
colò Machiavelli’s work. It should not 
be surprising, however, that Speroni 
never quotes Machiavelli. The date of 
Della pace is unknown, but even if Sper-
oni wrote this before the inclusion of 
Machiavelli’s writings on the Index of 
Prohibited Books (1559) by the Catholic 
Inquisition, the condemnation of the 
evil Segretario would have discouraged 
any explicit reference even before that 
date. As is the case for many other au-
thors, however, who wrote about pol-
itics after the publication of Machia- 
velli’s works, his revolutionary theo-
ries should not be disregarded and it 
is almost impossible to overestimate 
his influence in the fifteen century and 
beyond. Indeed, Speroni seems to have 
learned Machiavelli’s lessons on many 
levels, but more than a repetition of his 
thought, he seems influenced by his 
disenchanted pragmatism upon which 
he built his own discourse. He follows 
Machiavelli’s so-called “negative anthro-
pology” as it is pictured in the treatise Il 
principe and in the play La mandragola. 
He implicitly agrees with Machiavel-
li’s rejection of any imaginary republic 
(Il principe XV) and his consideration of 
conflicts as legitimate and useful aspects 
of political life (Discorsi sopra la prima 
deca di Tito Livio I, 4 and 6). Speroni also 
embraces the necessity of considering 
only the “verità effettuale”, avoiding 
any discourse on what reality should 
be and focusing on what it actually is.6 
Speroni connects the political conflict 
to a more general state of being, beyond 
the political sphere, which consists of 
a representation of reality that goes be-
yond human nature and includes it in 
a broader prospective, a position con-
firmed in the dialogue on discord pub-
lished in 1542 and already mentioned 
above. The entire subject of Della pace is 
also treated with a constant parallel re-
flection on the linguistic issues and the 
shifting meanings of discussing peace. 
Both these aspects (the almighty discord 
and the linguistic approach) go beyond 
Machiavelli’s legacy and represent the 




Words are misleading and language is 
haunted by a paradox: it explains and 
hides, communicates and confuses at 
the same time. The first lines of Sper-
oni’s text point to a broader linguistic 
view in the background, and not an op-
timistic one, starting with the keyword 
in the title, peace, but also its opposite, 
war. The less than straightforward rela-
tionships between the words and their 
meaning might depend on the fact that 
6 The most recent study on the role of 
conflict in Machiavelli is Pedullà 2018, 
while Vasoli (1996, p. 290) found analo-
gies with Machiavelli’s  political thought 
in Speroni’s Apologia dei dialoghi IV. 
A  wider exploration of Machiavelli’s  in-
fluence in Speroni is still neglected as 
well as a  study on his political philos-
ophy spread not only in several of his 
“trattatelli”, but also in his Dialoghi and 
Apologia dei dialoghi. 
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any word has several meanings, or nu-
ances within the same meaning, includ-
ing a common use but also other less 
common, so that it is impossible to find 
a permanent stable signification, meta-
physically and meta-historically guaran-
teed, that reassures us on the meaning 
of each word. 
Although the focus of the Della pace 
is not linguistic, this text begins with 
a linguistic concern (“la pace è nome 
equivoco … La guerra anch’essa è equi- 
voca”) which emphasizes the equivocal-
ity of the two key terms that demarcate, 
as opposites and implying each other, 
the subject treated in Speroni’s writ-
ing. The adjective “equivoca” reappears 
further in the text to qualify the term 
“concordia”, while towards the end of 
the text the substantive “equivocazion” 
is used to express one of the aims of his 
text: to distinguish the equivocalness of 
the term peace. 
Due to the frequency of the common 
misunderstanding and the semantic in-
stability of the terms he is talking about, 
the author requires from himself and 
the reader an effort in maintaining 
an awareness of different meanings of 
peace, concord and the other main terms 
of the discourse. Indeed, shifting from 
the conventional meaning to a different 
one allows for a reshaping of the entire 
field of analysis so that we suddenly find 
ourselves on a new path which leads to 
unconventional conclusions, far from 
the humanistic thought. The idea that 
concord in the city does not have, for 
example, anything to do with true (in 
a  platonic and Christian sense) har-
mony, but is rather a counter-instinctual 
effort to be carried out for the benefit of 
the community and finally for the sur-
vival of the citizens.
A different word meaning can lead to 
an uncommon thinking path. I do not 
want to emphasize too much this aspect 
of the text, but if we avoid the linguistic 
problem that Speroni himself poses at 
the beginning, we risk a misunderstand-
ing of the entire text. This entanglement 
between res and verba leads us back to 
the dawn of the onto-linguistic problem 
discussed in Plato’s Cratilus, a text that 
Speroni should have known, as well as 
all the rest of Plato’s dialogues, thanks 
to Marsilio Ficino’s Latin translation, if 
not directly from the original Greek. An 
echo of the problematic relationship be-
tween language and reality discussed in 
the Cratilus is clearly involved in Sper-
oni’s thought. It is not the aim of my 
contribution to investigate in detail the 
sources and the plurality of possible an-
cient references - either for the linguis-
tic aspect or for any other aspect of Della 
pace – that Speroni could have taken into 
account (mostly to reject them), in writ-
ing on the meaning and applicability 
of peace in a city. But if I had to briefly 
summarize Speroni’s position before 
antiquity, I would point to his strong an-
ti-Platonism and anti-Augustinianism 
along with a more tolerated Aristote-
lianism, but with a strong taste of so-
called pre-Socratic traditions along with 
the above-mentioned Heraclitism and 
even more a sophistic component (consi- 
dering both linguistic concerns, i.e. 
Gorgias of Leontini, and the political 
pragmatism, i.e. Protagoras of Abdera). 
Having said that, I refrain from a deeper 
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investigation which goes beyond the two 
aims of my contribution: to provide the 
reader with direct access to Speronis’ 
text (in the Appendix below) and shed 
light on its highlights (in my analysis 
above). 
It is regretful that Speroni’s notes 
never became a more articulated and 
refined work. Reading the Della pace, 
as well as many other of Speroni’s “trat-
tatelli”, I regret not having the opportu-
nity to know more extensively what Sper-
oni would have written on the rejection of 
the simple and naive idea of political con-
cord for a more realistic concept of peace 
in the context of a pragmatic political 
theory based on a realistic anthropology 
which anchors men to their animal na-
ture. Speroni’s “trattatelli” represent 
a cluster of unaccomplished, potentially 
revolutionary, writings which are still 
waiting to be explored. This paper would 
also like to encourage further investiga-
tion in this direction. 
appendIx: speronI’s Della 
pace (In speronI 1740, p. 437–8)
I use modern punctuation in my tran-
scription to facilitate the reading of the 
original text, while my English trans-
lation aims at balancing the literal tex-
tual meaning with the need to maintain 
a logical order and readability through-
out Speroni’s argumentation. 
La pace è nome equivoco veramente. 
Comunemente si usa per l’opposto della 
guerra. La guerra anche essa è equivoca. 
Comunemente si usa per la battaglia mor-
tale, ove si ammazzano li inimici. La pace 
significa comunemente anche concordia 
o di opinioni o di volontà, che è unione. 
Unione è quando varie cose si uniscono fa-
cendo una cosa, come quando gli elementi 
meschiandosi fanno il misto, o il corpo 
e l’anima a fare il vivo, o la materia e la 
forma a fare il composito. E questa unione 
non è nella pace di che si parla; perciocché 
questa unione non di contrarii, ma di due 
cose sostanziali, e per sé sussistenti e per-
fette. La pace adunque di cui si parla è con-
cordia, la quale è nelli uomini di opinioni 
o di volontadi le quali si accordino come le 
voci nell’armonia. Concordia di opinioni 
non ha nome proprio volgar né latino. 
Concordia di volontadi è benevoglienza, 
e quando è compita si può dire amicizia. 
Peace is a truly equivocal term, which 
is usually used as the opposite of war, but 
also this term is equivocal. War is com-
monly used to indicate a deadly battle in 
which one kills one’s enemy. Peace com-
monly also means concord of opinions 
or wills, which means union. Union is 
when different things unify making one 
thing, which is when the elements blend 
and make a mix, or body and soul make 
a living being, or matter and form make 
a compound. And this union is not in the 
peace that we are here talking about, be-
cause this union is not made by contraries 
but rather two perfect substances that ex-
ist independently. The peace that we are 
talking about is therefore concord, which 
is in men’s opinions or wills that can tune 
with each other like harmonic voices. 
Concord of opinion has no vernacular or 
Latin name. Concord of wills is benevo-
lence and can be called friendship when 
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Ma questa è equivoca, ed anche quella di 
opinion, secondo le cose intorno alle quali 
sono le opinion e le volontadi. Alla con-
cordia di due voleri si reduce quella della 
ragione e dell’affetto. La ragion vuole, ed 
appetisce l’affetto. L’uomo è composto di 
contrarii; anzi tutto ’l mondo. Però difficil 
cosa è trovar pace nell’uomo, cioè concor-
dia. Ma se la contrarietà o discordia del 
mondo è fatta dalla natura o da Dio a fin 
di bene, cioè acciocché ne nascano diverse 
cose, e la diversità delle stagioni nell’anno, 
e di giorno e notte, e questo bene sono pi-
ante, bestie ed uomini, dovemo anche pen-
sare che le discordie de’ voleri delli uomini 
facciano effetti boni; e che perciò siano 
permessi e fatti da Dio. Li effetti che ne na-
scono son le virtù. Ben considera. E dalla 
discordia della ragione e degli affetti na-
scono, benché non si concordino, come è il 
martirio per la verità. In summa chi vuol 
ben parlar della pace diversa alla guerra, 
parli prima della pace di sé medesimo tra 
la ragione e lo affetto, e come il mondo 
è composto di contrarii a fin di bene, così 
qui si cerchi la pace tra li uomini non per-
ché essi si concordino, ché ciò è difficile, 
se non impossibile, ma acciocché nasca 
la quiete della città, il che è fine e felicità 
dell’uomo. E questo basti al presente. Ma 
cercar pace che veramente sia concordia 
e benevolenza e salute dell’uomo partico-
lare partiene a solo il cristiano, perché 
egli solo va alla salute particolare; ove 
il filosofo va alla specie, la felicità della 
quale, tal quale è, partiene alla città. E se ’l 
filosofo va al particolare, ponendo summa 
felicità nel filosofo contemplativo; il cris-
tiano va al particolare religioso e di buon 
volere; e ciò nota bene. Il non fare altrui 
quello che a noi stessi non vogliamo esser 
it is complete. But this is equivocal as well 
as the concord of opinions regarding the 
objects of these opinions and wills. The 
concord of reason and appetite is definable 
as a concord of wills: while reason wants, 
appetite desires. Not only the human being 
is made of contraries but also the entire 
world. This is why it is difficult to make 
peace, as concord, in the human being. But 
if contrariety and discord in the world are 
caused by nature and God for a good end, 
i.e. for the emergence of a variety of things, 
the different seasons of the year, day and 
night, and this good end is the plants, 
animals and human beings, we must also 
consider that the discords among different 
men’s wills bring about positive results 
for which those discords are allowed and 
made by God, and the virtues derive from 
this state of being. Consider this carefully. 
And these virtues are caused by the discord 
between reason and passions, although 
they do not agree with it, like martyrdom 
for the truth. In summary, he who wants 
to speak correctly about peace different 
from war should first talk about the peace 
within oneself between reason and pas-
sions, and consider that the world is made 
of contraries for a good end, and, therefore, 
one should aim at peace among men not to 
make them agree (since this is difficult) 
but rather to build a peaceful city, which 
is men’s aim and happiness. And this is 
enough at the moment. But looking for 
peace that truly is concord, benevolence 
and the health of an individual belongs 
only to the Christian, because he is the only 
one who considers the individual health, 
while the philosopher considers the spe-
cies whose happiness, in itself, belongs to 
the city. And while the philosopher looks 
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fatto è cosa anzi sopra natura che natu-
rale: è ben cosa ragionevole se la ragione 
domina l’appetito; e anche dominando 
ella lo affetto, non è vero generalmente; 
perciocché l’uomo vuol dominare e non 
esser dominato, massime se è signor, come 
si dice, per natura; vuol giudicare e non es-
sere giudicato; ed esser uomo tra femmine 
e non femmina tra uomini. Le fere fanno 
altrui quel che a sé non vogliono che sia 
fatto, mangiandole e sforzandole. A far 
gli uomini particolari per lo comun civile 
e salute sua, come fa il mondo a ben della 
specie umana, saria bona cosa quando la 
repubblica fosse perfetta, ma quale delle 
tre note è perfetta? Certo niuna: sola la 
cristiana è perfetta. Dunque filosofica-
mente parlando, cessa la ragion della città 
in tutti gli uomini, specialmente ne’ servi 
e ne’ sudditi; e ciò nota bene. A questa sola 
si de’ rimetter la vita, la roba, l’onore, e i fi-
glioli, ché ciò facendo si acquista la vera 
ed eterna felicità. È dunque impossibile 
la vera pace tra gli uomini se non nella 
repubblica cristiana. Puossi inferire che 
vera pace per sé non possa essere ne’ cori 
umani ma solamente per grazia di Dio. Né 
questa cercano le repubbliche, ma quella 
sola onde non possa nascere alcun male 
pubblico evidentemente, non curando 
dello intrinseco del core umano. E forse 
anche perciò non può essere in terra ver-
ace pace; perché noi facciamo il bene anzi 
con speranza di premio e timor di pena, 
che per ben fare, onde si dice di Job erat 
timens Deum; e dimandavano li apostoli 
quid erit nobis? {p. 438} E certo se la pace 
non può esser se non nelli uomini di bona 
voluntade e la bontà del voler nostro sia 
grazia di Dio, la pace è non è da noi ma 
da Dio. La vera pace vien da Dio, ma la 
at the individual when it considers the 
highest happiness in the contemplative 
philosopher, the Christian instead looks 
at a specific believer and his good will; 
and consider this carefully. Do not do to 
others what we would not want done to 
us is something more above nature than 
natural: it is reasonable if the reason con-
trols the desire; and even if it controls the 
passions this is not generally true, because 
man wants to dominate and not be domi-
nated (even more if he is a lord, as we say, 
by nature). He wants to judge and not be 
judged, and wants to be male among fe-
males and not the opposite. The beasts do 
to others what they would not want done to 
them, by eating and forcing the others. It 
would be good to consider the individuals 
for common civic life and its well-being, 
as the world does for the goodness of the 
human species, if the republic could be per-
fect, but which of the three that we know is 
perfect? Certainly there is no perfect one 
except for the Christian republic. Hence, 
philosophically speaking, the reason of 
the city stops in all men, especially in the 
servants and subjects; and consider this 
carefully. Therefore, true peace is impos-
sible except for in the Christian republic. 
One can infer from this that no true peace 
can come from the human heart but only 
from God’s grace. And the republics do not 
look for this true peace but rather only for 
the peace that means absence of any public 
harm and, in so doing, does not deal with 
the intentions of man’s heart. And this is 
perhaps also why true peace is not possible 
on earth, because we do good deeds not for 
ourselves but rather hoping for a prize and 
fearing a punishment, and this is why one 
talks about Job erat timens Deum, and the 
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pace che dà il mondo, la quale è diversa 
da quella di Dio, è sempre con peccato, 
perché ha l’occhio o alla vita o all’onore 
o alla facultà pubblica e private. Però in 
questo trattato si doveria distinguer la 
equivocazion della pace e mostrare che la 
naturale non è possibile essendo l’uomo 
composto di cose contrarie e discordanti, 
ciò sono li elementi, l’anima e il corpo, 
materia e forma, ragione e affetto, spirito 
e carne. La civile è simulata e non cor-
diale. La cordiale è da Dio, e ciò nota. 
Amicizia, mondanamente parlando, è più 
che la pace; perciocché ella è concordia di 
volontade e di vera benivolenza. Ma par-
lando per vero, ed in Cristo, non è buona 
quella amicizia dal mondo bona stimata, 
e non è virtù anche mondanamente, né 
con virtù. Vedi la ragione perché tal mon-
dana amicizia può esser tra viziosi, il che 
appar per quella mondana amicizia di doi 
o tre para di amici: ché Teseo e Piritoo 
non furono boni, né Pilade ed Oreste, né 
Patroclo ed Achille. Di Pitia e Damone 
non trovo vita né opre. E nel far delle paci 
tali quali possono esser tra noi, bisogna 
considerare la diversità delle tre o quattro 
repubbliche, poiché la perfetta non è nota 
se non al cristiano. Però trattar di pace 
o guerra o duelli senza questa distinzione 
è cosa vana. Che le repubbliche diverse 
siano qui da considerare, Aristotile il dice 
nella Rettorica parlando della orazione.
apostles asked quid erit nobis? {p. 438} And 
of course if peace can be in men of good 
will and only this good will can come from 
God’s grace, than peace comes not from 
us but from God. Hence true peace comes 
from God but the peace that comes from 
this world, which is different from the one 
from God, is always imperfect, because it 
aims at the life or honor or public and pri-
vate spheres. This is the reason why in this 
treatise the equivocalness of peace should 
be avoided to demonstrate that peace in 
nature is impossible, given that man is 
made of contrary and discordant things: 
different elements, soul and body, matter 
and form, reason and passions, spirit and 
flesh. Civil peace is simulated and not cor-
dial. The cordial one is from God, and note 
this. Friendship, worldly speaking, is more 
than peace, because it is concord of wills 
and true benevolence. But speaking truly, 
and in Christ, the friendship that the world 
considers good is not good and it is neither 
a virtue nor accomplished with virtue even 
in worldly  terms. And the proof is that this 
worldly friendship could also be between 
vicious men, which is clear in the worldly 
friendship of two or three pairs of friends, 
since Theseus and Pirithous, Pylades and 
Orestes, and Patroclus and Achilles were 
not virtuous; while I do not find either life 
or acts of Pythias and Damon. And to carry 
out the peace that can be done among us, 
we have to consider the diversities among 
the three or four republics, since the per-
fect republic is known only by the perfect 
Christian. Therefore, talking about peace 
or war or duels without this distinction is 
a vain thing. Also Aristotle says that dif-
ferent republics must be considered when 
he talks about the oration in his Rhetoric.
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